Threshold machines are Turing machines whose acceptance is determined by what portion of the machine's computation paths are accepting paths. Probabilistic machines are Turing machines whose acceptance is determined by the probability weight of the machine's accepting computation paths. In 1975, Simon proved that for unboundederror polynomial-time machines these two notions yield the same class, PP. Perhaps because Simon's result seemed to collapse the threshold and probabilistic modes of computation, the relationship between threshold and probabilistic computing for the case of bounded error has remained unexplored.
Introduction
In 1975, Simon Sim75] de ned threshold machines. A threshold machine is a nondeterministic Turing machine that accepts a given input if more than half of all computation paths on that input are accepting paths. Gill Gil77] de ned the class PP as the class of sets for which there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machine that accepts exactly the members of the set with probability greater than 1/2. Simon Sim75] showed that the class of sets accepted by polynomial-time threshold machines characterizes the unbounded-error probabilistic class PP.
In this paper, we extend the notion of threshold computation to bounded-error probabilistic classes, and we study the degree to which threshold and probabilistic database (\oracle") computations hide information from observers.
In particular, we introduce BPP path and R path as the threshold analogs of BPP and R Gil77]. We give evidence that, unlike the case for PP, these threshold classes are di erent from their probabilistic counterparts. Section 3 studies the properties of the class BPP path and its relationship to other complexity classes. For example, we show|in contrast to the BPP case|that BPP path is self-low (i.e., BPP path BPP path = BPP path ) only if the polynomial hierarchy collapses. We also show that BPP is low for BPP path , that there is a relativized world in which BPP path does not contain the smallest reasonable counting class, and that BPP path has many closure properties. Figure 1 gives an overview of the inclusion relations we establish between BPP path and other complexity classes; in particular, note that, though contained in the polynomial hierarchy, BPP path contains NP and coNP.
Section 4 studies, for threshold and probabilistic computations that have Turing (that is, adaptive) access to a database, the degree to which the input can be hidden from an observer. In particular, we consider the least restrictive possible notion ensuring that a powerful observer should gain no information about the input other than its length BF90]. For the cases of unbounded-error probabilistic and threshold computation, we note that this optimal degree of security can be achieved in all cases. For the cases of bounded-error probabilistic and threshold computations, we prove the following result: If there exists any database D to which secure access yields more power than oblivious access (a notion in which the querying machine|until nished querying|is wholly denied access to the input other than the length of the input FFLS92]), then P 6 = PSPACE. As an open problem, we ask whether BPP path is contained in p 2 , or even R NP . There is an oracle relative to which BPP path is not in P NP .
De nitions and Discussion
Throughout this paper, we use the alphabet = f0; 1g. For a string x 2 , jxj denotes the length of x. For a set A , A(x) denotes the characteristic function of A, A =n denotes f y y 2 A and jyj = n g, A n denotes f y y 2 A and jyj n g, and kAk denotes the cardinality of A. The complement of A is A = ? A, and for a class C of sets, co C = f A A 2 C g.
! be a polynomial-time computable, polynomial-time invertible, one-to-one, onto function. For any string z, let z+1 denote the string that lexicographically follows z, and for any string z 6 = , let z ? 1 denote the string that lexicographically precedes z. Let k s be the lexicographically kth string in . We de ne our (multi-arity, onto) pairing function by (x 1 ; x 2 ; ; x k ) equals (a) P (NP) denotes the class of languages that are accepted by polynomial-time deterministic (nondeterministic) Turing machines. For nondeterministic Turing machines we assume without loss of generality that the nondeterministic branching degree is at most two. M is polynomial-normalized (henceforward denoted normalized) if there is a polynomial p such that on every input x the machine M makes exactly p(jxj) nondeterministic moves on each computation path. FP is the class of polynomial-time computable functions. One can de ne relativized classes such as P NP (respectively, P NP log] ) by employing P machines having some NP oracle that can be asked polynomially (respectively, logarithmically) many queries, i.e., so-called oracle machines BGS75] . This is called a Turing reduction (to NP). If the queries are made nonadaptively (i.e., in parallel) we call this a truth-table reduction (see Ladner, Lynch, and Selman LLS75]). By P NP tt we denote the class of sets that are truth-table reducible to NP. But in fact, P NP tt = P NP log] Hem89].
The polynomial hierarchy MS72,Sto77] is de ned as follows. P=poly KL80] denotes the class of sets having small circuits.
For a nondeterministic polynomial-time Turing machine M, let acc M (x) (rej M (x)) denote the number of accepting (rejecting) paths of M on input x and let total M (x) denote the total number of paths of M on input x. #P is the class of functions f such that for some nondeterministic polynomial-time Turing machine M it holds that (8x) f(x) = acc M (x)].
Probabilistic and Threshold Computation
A probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machine Gil77] is a nondeterministic polynomialtime Turing machine M such that M chooses with equal probability each of the nondeterministic choices at each choice point. Pr M(x) = 1] denotes the probability weight of those paths on which M accepts x and Pr M(x) = 0] denotes the probability weight of those paths on which M rejects x.
We now de ne some complexity classes in terms of probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machines.
De nition 2.1 Probabilistic Classes] The class PP can also be characterized as the class of sets L such that there exist a nondeterministic polynomial-time Turing machine M and a function f 2 FP such that for all x 2 it holds that x 2 L () acc M (x) f(x).
By looking at the portion of accepting paths rather than the probability weight of the accepting paths, we now introduce the threshold analogs of the above probabilistic classes.
De nition 2. 
It is easy to see that R path BPP path PP path . For all threshold classes in this paper, as a notational convenience we will place oracles above the word \path" (e.g., BPP BPP path denotes (BPP path ) BPP ). It is known that R, BPP, and PP sets can be accepted via normalized probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machines: just extend each computation path of a given machine up to a xed polynomial length and, on each new path, accept if the path that was extended accepted, and otherwise reject. The modi ed machine has the same acceptance probability as the original one. Observe that for normalized machines, the probabilistic interpretation of the machine accepts the same set as the threshold interpretation of the machine. Thus, each of the probabilistic classes is contained in the corresponding threshold class, i.e., PP PP path , BPP BPP path and R R path .
In fact, Simon Sim75] has already shown that PP path is not a bigger class than PP. For completeness we give a proof here. Interestingly, this equivalence between probabilistic and threshold classes cannot hold for R and BPP unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses to its second level. This follows from the fact that NP is contained in R path and thus is also contained in BPP path . We have seen now that there are some crucial di erences between BPP and its threshold analog, BPP path . We will study BPP path in more detail in Section 3, and especially, we will strengthen Corollary 2.5.
Secure Computation
In this subsection and in Section 4, we study notions of secure adaptive access to databases in the presence of a powerful spying observer. We give below what we feel are the most natural de nitions. In these de nitions, we obtain security by requiring that an observer (seeing a path drawn uniformly from all the machine's paths) should learn nothing about the input string other than perhaps its length. For threshold computation, this notion is new. For probabilistic computation, the appendix section, Section 6, proves that this de nition is equivalent to the notion of \one-oracle instance-hiding schemes that leak at most the length of their inputs" BF90]. The original motivation for such classes, as explained for example by Beaver and Feigenbaum BF90] , is, very roughly, to study whether weak devices can solve hard problems by asking some powerful device questions in such a way that no observer can tell which problem was actually solved by the weak device. Since NP BPP path , BPP path clearly is not a computationally weak class. It nonetheless makes sense to consider the same interactive model in the case that applies here: studying whether a relatively powerful class (BPP path ) can use a (potentially powerful) information source while shielding information on the problem being solved even from extremely powerful observers.
De nition 2.6 Secure Threshold Computation] For any set D, a set A is said to be in secureBPP D path (that is, is said to be \securely accepted by a bounded-error threshold polynomial-time machine via access to database D") if there is a nondeterministic polynomial-time Turing machine N such that: Formally, is obliviousBPP D path 6 = secureBPP D path or obliviousBPP D 6 = secureBPP D ? Our intuition says that both inequalities hold. However, Section 4 shows that establishing that \yes" is the answer implies that P 6 = PSPACE (and even implies the stronger result that BPP 6 = PP). Since it is commonly believed that P 6 = PSPACE, this does not provide evidence that equality holds; rather, it merely suggests that witnessing a separation will be hard with current techniques. We note that results (such as Theorem 4.1 and Corollary 4.2) that connect the existence of an oracle separation to the existence of a real-world separation (see, e.g., the survey Boo89]) usually occur in cases in which the oracle is tremendously restricted (e.g., to the class of tally sets or the class of sparse sets BBS86,LS86]); in contrast, Section 4 provides such a relativization result that applies without restriction of the database D.
Note that we could also de ne classes, partially-secure-BPP D path and partially-secure-BPP D , based on the notion (see, e.g., FFLS92] and the papers cited therein) that an observer watching one query should get no information other than perhaps about the length Though for most common classes C it holds that (8L) L 2 C L ], Corollary 2.10 should not be surprising; it is natural that weak machines, when accepting a hard set via a hard database, may leak some information to an observer. Interestingly, a similar result holds for secure computation. Namely, Abadi, Feigenbaum, and Kilian AFK89] have shown that secureBPP D NP=poly\coNP=poly for any database D. Thus, for any set D, no NP-hard set is in secureBPP D unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses.
BPP path
We have already argued that BPP and BPP path di er unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses. These classes nonetheless share certain properties. For example, as is also the case for BPP ZH86], BPP path has a strong ampli cation property. Consider the machine M 0 that on input x, jxj = n, computes y 1 ; : : :; y k , the truth-table queries of M on input x, where k q(n), and, for each query y i , machine M 0 guesses a path of N on input y i and takes the output of this path as the answer to query y i , for i = 1; : : :; k. Using these answers instead of the oracle B, M 0 simulates M on input x and outputs the result.
M 0 has total M 0 (x) = Q k i=1 total N (y i ) paths. At least on those paths on which all the answers to the oracle queries are correct, M 0 decides correctly whether x is in A, i.e., we
This shows that A 2 BPP path . Corollary 3.3 BPP path is closed under complementation, intersection, and union.
Since NP is contained in BPP path , it follows that the closure of NP under truth-table reductions is contained in BPP path .
Corollary 3.4 P NP log] BPP path .
It is known that BPP is low for PP KSTT92] and for itself Ko82, Zac82] , i.e., PP BPP = PP and BPP BPP = BPP. We show in the next theorem that BPP is also low for BPP path . Observe that relative to Beigel's previously mentioned oracle making P NP not contained in PP, we must also have that NP, and hence BPP path , cannot be low for PP. That is, there exists an A such that PP BPP A path 6 = PP A . Furthermore, by an easy induction, we have that if BPP path is low for itself then the polynomial hierarchy, PH, is contained in BPP path . But, as we will see in Theorem 3.11 below, BPP path is contained in some level of the polynomial hierarchy. Thus, BPP path is not low for BPP path unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses. Let B = f (0 n ; w 1 ; a 1 ; : : :; w k ; a k ) k p(n) and (8i : 1 i k) jw i j p(n) and A(w i ) = a i ] g. Since BPP is closed under truth-table reductions Ko82,Zac82], B 2 BPP.
Hence, there exist a probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machine M B and a polynomial q such that, for any input z = (0 n ; w 1 ; a 1 ; : : :; w k ; a k ), M B 's error probability is bounded by 2 ?(p(n)+4) and M B 's computation tree is a full binary tree with total M B (z) = 2 q(n) .
Consider the machine M 0 that on input x, jxj = n, performs the following steps.
1. M 0 simulates M A on input x. Whenever M queries the oracle, M 0 nondeterministically guesses the answer. Let (w 1 ; a 1 ); : : :; (w k ; a k ) be the sequence of queried strings and guessed answers along a computation path y.
2. To verify the guessed answers, M 0 simulates M B on input (0 n ; w 1 ; a 1 ; : : :; w k ; a k ). 3. M 0 ampli es the output of M on path y from the rst step if the guessed answers there are certi ed in the second step. More precisely, M 0 now appends 2 p(n)+4 accepting (rejecting) paths if path y was accepting (rejecting) and the simulation in the second step ended in an accepting path of M B . Otherwise, M 0 rejects. After the rst two steps, M 0 has at most 2 p(n) 2 q(n) computation paths. In the last step, M 0 ampli es all paths (a) in which the guessed oracle answers are correct and that are certi ed by M B in the second step, i.e., at most total M A(x) 2 q(n) paths, and (b) all paths in which the guessed oracle answers are false but are wrongly certi ed by M B , i.e., at most 2 p(n) 2 ?(p(n)+4) 2 q(n) paths. So we have
The paths on which M 0 decides correctly include at least those paths that correspond to correct paths of M in the rst step and are subsequently certi ed in the second step.
Since these paths are ampli ed in the last step, we have We mention that we could get a shorter proof by applying the results of Stockmeyer Sto85] to approximate #P functions and of Jerrum, Valiant, and Vazirani JVV86], who showed a probabilistic version of Stockmeyer's theorem. However, we prefer to give a self-contained proof here, thereby encouraging the reader to see whether he or she can improve our result, for example, by getting a one-sided error probabilistic algorithm (in Part 2 of Theorem 3.11). Since there is an oracle relative to which BPP is not contained in P NP Sto85], one cannot obtain a deterministic algorithm with relativizable techniques.
De nition 3. if k a > k r then accept else reject.
By the de nition of k A , we always have k A k a . Note that, by the upper bound of Corollary 3.10 and since k A p(n), it follows that log(kAk=p(n)) k A . From Lemma 3.9, it follows that k a blog kAkc+2 holds with probability at least 7/8. Since the same bounds hold for k r , we have that with probability at least 3/4 it holds that both (a) log acc M (x) p(n) k a log acc M (x) + 2, and (b) log rej M (x) p(n) k r log rej M (x) + 2. This implies that for all but nitely many x it holds that x 2 L () k a > k r , with probability at least 3/4. Thus, L 2 BPP NP .
As already mentioned before Theorem 3.5, BPP path cannot be low for itself unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses to BPP path . From Theorem 3.11 we thus have the following claim. Corollary 3.13 p 2 BPP path =) PH = BPP NP .
Toda Tod91] and Toda and Ogiwara TO92] showed that PH BPP C for any class C among fPP; C = P; Pg. As a consequence, none of these classes can be contained in the polynomial hierarchy unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses. Thus, none of these classes can be contained in BPP path unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses.
Ogiwara and Hemachandra Fenner, Fortnow, and Kurtz FFK94] argue that SPP is, in some sense, the smallest class that is de nable in terms of the number of accepting and rejecting computations. In particular, SPP is low for PP; C = P, and P FFK94]. Though it is an open question whether SPP is contained in BPP path , there is an oracle relative to which this is not the case. 2 Theorem 3.15 There is an oracle A such that SPP A 6 BPP A path . Proof: Let M 1 ; M 2 ; : : : be an enumeration of nondeterministic polynomial-time Turing machines and let p 1 ; p 2 ; : : : be an enumeration of polynomials such that polynomial p i bounds the runtime of machine M i . Without loss of generality, we assume p i (n) = n i +i. Let s(i), i = 1; 2; : : :, be a sequence of integers de ned by s(1) = 5 and, for i > 1, s(i+1) = 2 s(i) .
We de ne the test language L(A) = f 1 n (9j) n = s(j) and kA =n k = 2 n?1 ] g:
Below, we will construct a set A such that for every i 1, kA =s(i) k is either 2 s(i) It follows from Theorem 3.1 that the existence of such an oracle establishes the theorem.
We construct the set A in stages. In stage i, we diagonalize against machine M i . Initially, i = 1 and A 1 = ;.
Stage i. Let n = s(i). We will add only strings of length n to A i . Since p j (s(j)) < n for all j < i, this will not e ect the construction done in earlier stages. 
Suppose X 2 A. If 1 n 6 2 L(M X i ) then we are done since 1 n 2 L(X). So suppose that 1 n 2 L(M X i ). For w 2 X \ n , de ne X w = X ?fwg. By de nition, 1 n 6 2 L(X w ). We claim that there exists a w 2 X \ n such that 1 n 2 L(M Xw i ). For such a w, de ne A i+1 = X w .
Then requirement (R2) is ful lled.
To prove our claim, assume that, for all w 2 X \ n , it holds that 1 n 6 2 L(M Xw i ). By (1 n ) queries to its oracle. Since p i (n) < 2 n?2 , this yields a contradiction.
The case X 2 B is symmetric. Here, one has to de ne X w by adding a string w 2 n ?X to X, and then, in case Proof: Assume BPP = PP. Note that this implies that BPP = P #P (since P PP = P #P BBS86] and BPP = P BPP ). Let D be a database and let L be a language such that L 2 secureBPP D path . We will show that L 2 obliviousBPP D path , thereby proving the theorem. Let N be the machine of De nition 2.6 certifying that L 2 secureBPP D path . We may assume, without loss of generality (since it is easy to see that secureBPP D path machines can be ampli ed in the standard way and still remain secure) that the of De nition 2.6 satis es > 1=4. Also, let p(n) be a polynomial, of the form n i + i for some integer i 1, such that for all sets L the runtime of N L is at most p(n).
Very informally summarized, in the following a secure computation of N is decomposed (query vector by query vector), to allow an oblivious BPP path machine to mimic N's computation. This will be possible because our assumption gives #P-like computational power to our oblivious BPP path machine. More formally, we partition the unit interval into 2 q intervals of equal length, for some appropriately chosen q, and take the largest k=2 q , k 2 f 0; : : :; 2 q ?1 g, that is still less than Clearly, A 2 P #P , and thus A is in BPP, by assumption. Hence, there exist a probabilistic machine M A and a polynomial h such that M A accepts A with error probability bounded by 2 ?q , and furthermore, for any input (y; w; W; j), the computation tree of M A is a full binary tree with 2 h(jyj) paths.
In order to test whether (x; v; V; k) is in A, Q simulates M A on input (x; v; V; k). Q accepts x if and only if the simulation ends in an accepting state of M A . This completes the de nition of Q.
We will argue that the machine Q has the desired properties. By the de nition of Q, it is clearly an oblivious machine. Furthermore, for any given input x, let v be a query vector that actually occurs in the run of N D (x). From equation (1) 
Open Problems
There are several open problems regarding BPP path . Is BPP path contained in p 2 or even in R NP ? It seems that the proof technique of Theorem 3.11 doesn't su ce to establish either of these relationships. Does BPP path have complete sets? There is a relativized world in which BPP lacks complete sets HH88]; we conjecture that the same holds for BPP path .
Regarding secure computation, does there exist a structural condition that completely characterizes the conditions under which ( The secure probabilistic computation of De nition 2.7 can be considered a special case of 2-player interactive computation. In particular, the database can be considered a powerful player that truthfully answers di cult questions asked by a polynomial-time player. When the powerful player in a secure probabilistic computation answers a query, it is unable to take the past history of transactions into consideration. In contrast, players in the usual interactive computation models can remember the history of past transactions. Nonetheless, the secure probabilistic computation model is quite powerful. Even if the database is replaced with a deterministic player that has unlimited computation power and memory, it is clear that the resulting interactive computation can be simulated by a polynomial-time player with a new database that is merely a set.
In this section, we consider the e ect of allowing the powerful player to be probabilistic. The resulting model is called a one-oracle instance-hiding scheme that leaks at most the length of its input BF90]. We present a slightly modi ed but equivalent de nition.
De nition 6.1 One-oracle instance-hiding schemes that leaks at most the length of its input] For a set L, a one-oracle instance-hiding scheme that leaks at most 2. The messages reveal no information to an observer other than perhaps the length of the input] For every k 2 f0; 1; 2; g, and every vector v = (q 1 ; a 1 ; q 2 ; a 2 ; ; q k ; a k ), q 1 ; a 1 ; q 2 ; a 2 ; ; q k ; a k 2 , and every pair of strings x 2 and y 2 such that jxj = jyj, it holds that Pr = v on input x] = Pr = v on input y].
For any polynomial p( ), the above probability 1=2 + can be ampli ed to 1 ? 2 ?p(jxj) via the standard technique of repeating computations and using the most frequent result.
Clearly, if L 2 secureBPP D for some database D, then L has a one-oracle instance-hiding scheme that leaks at most the length of its input. The following theorem, pointed out to us by an anonymous conference referee, shows that the converse is also true.
Theorem 6.2 If L is a language that has a one-oracle instance-hiding scheme that leaks at most the length of its input, then there exists a database D such that L 2 secureBPP D .
Proof: Let L be a language that has a one-oracle instance-hiding scheme that leaks at most the length of its input. In this proof, we use the notation of De nition 6.1. Following AFK89], we use the term transcript to denote , the sequence of queries and answers along a computation path. Without loss of generality, we assume that no transcript is a proper pre x of another transcript and that the length of an input is passed to M B as the rst query. In this proof, we rst show that M B can be modi ed so that it needs only a polynomial number of random bits. Then we show that these random bits can be supplied by M A , thereby eliminating the need for M B to be random. It follows that the resulting powerful but deterministic player can be replaced with a set as claimed in the theorem. In the rest of the proof, we call the machines M A and M B the client and the server, respectively.
Given an input of length n, the set of transcripts that have non-zero probabilities de ne a tree whose depth is bounded by a polynomial in n. Let's call this a strategy tree. (As will become clear later in this proof, the strategy tree e ectively de nes the strategy of the server. Also, it serves as a convenient template for modifying the strategy of the server.) There are two types of nodes in a strategy tree: server nodes and client nodes. These two types of nodes alternate in each path from the root to a leaf. The root is a client node. The leaves are also client nodes. Each edge from a client node is labeled with a query string; each edge from a server node is labeled with an answer string. Each leaf represents a transcript that has a non-zero probability; the transcript consists of labels read from the edges along the path from the root to the leaf. Edges from the same node have distinct labels so that a transcript de nes a unique path in a strategy tree. Corresponding to each internal node in a strategy tree, there exists a partial transcript that consists of the labels that are read from the edges along the path from the root to the node.
Associated with each leaf is the probability with which the transcript corresponding to the leaf occurs. Clearly, based on this probability distribution, we can associate with each internal node the probability with which the partial transcript corresponding to the node occurs. To each edge from a node, we associate the conditional probability with which its label occurs as the next query or answer in a computation, given that the current partial transcript of the computation is the one represented by the node. Note that the sum of the probabilities associated with all the edges from a node is one and that the probability associated with each node is the product of the probabilities associated with the edges along the path from the root to the node.
It is easy to see that an interactive computation reveals at most the length of the input (in the sense of Part 2 in De nition 6.1) if and only if its strategy tree is the same for all inputs of the same length. In particular, the strategy of the server (that is, the probability distribution among edges from each server node) is the same for all inputs of the same length. Further, if we modify the server but (i) we do not add new transcripts to the strategy tree and (ii) the client is not changed, then the resulting strategy tree is the same for all inputs of the same length. Hence, we may arbitrarily adjust the probability distribution among the existing edges from each server node without a ecting the instance-hiding nature of the computation. However, such change could a ect the acceptance probabilities of input strings. Therefore, in the following, we carefully modify the behavior of the server so that the acceptance of each input string remains intact. In particular, assuming without loss of generality that the probability of correctness (in the sense of Part 1 in De nition 6.1) of the original instance-hiding computation is greater than 3 4 , we will ensure that the probability of correctness of the modi ed instance-hiding computation is greater than 5 8 .
Let q(n) be a polynomial that bounds both the length of the label of each edge and the depth of the strategy tree. The main obstacle in transforming the randomized server to a deterministic one is the fact that the probability of an edge from a server node can be an arbitrary value. In order to get around the obstacle, we adjust the probability of each edge from server nodes so that it is an integral multiple of 2 ?q 2 (n)?q(n)?3 and that it di ers from the original probability by less than 2 ?q 2 (n)?q(n)?3 . Thus, the probability change at each leaf of the strategy tree is less than q(n)2 ?q 2 (n)?q(n)?3 . Since there are at most 2 q 2 (n) leaves, it is easy to see that the change in the probability of correctness of the whole computation is less than 1 8 . Therefore, the probability of correctness of the modi ed secure computation is greater than 5 8 . Note that the resulting strategy tree can be constructed by the server upon receiving the rst query (i.e., the length of the input). The server uses this strategy tree to answer all the queries.
The server modi ed in this way needs at most a polynomial number (q(n)(q 2 (n) + q(n) + 3)) of random bits. Hence, the necessary random bits can be supplied to the server by the client at the beginning of a computation. Note that this modi cation a ects neither the instance-hiding nature of the computation nor the probability of correctness of the computation. The resulting server is deterministic, but it may not yet be considered a deterministic function oracle since it may give di erent answers to di erent instances of the same queried string. By pre xing each query with an appropriate public information with which the server can uniquely locate the current stage of computation in the strategy tree (for example, hq 1 ; : : :; q i?1 i can be used as a pre x to the i-th query along a computation path on which q j (0 < j < i) is the j-th query), the server can be transformed into a deterministic function oracle. It is easy to see that we can further modify the client so that it securely accepts the same language with a set oracle (D) instead of a function oracle. Clearly, the resulting computation is a secure probabilistic computation.
